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TRADE POLICY OUTLOOK IN US/EC RELATIONS 
1. Whereas in 1980 the deficit in the overall trade balance 
of the U.S. has decreased slightly, that of the 
Community has increased considerably, in particular 
as ·a result of a greatly enlarged bilateral deficit 
with the U.S. On the basis of the latest figures for 
1980, this deficit will have more than doubled that of 
1979, i.e. over$ 25 million. The major reason for 
this sharply increased deficit is a continuing of 
soaring imports of U.S. industrial goods and declining 
E.C. exports to the U.S. 
The economic outl9ok for 1981 is bleak and the poor 
performance of the European economies in 1981 will 
probably not differ very much from the 19eo picture. 
The measures foreseen by the new economic policy of 
the Re;.gan Administra_tion will certainly not have much 
effect before the second pari. of 1981, and their 
ultimate success is still open to questions. T.!:le latter 
is particularly true for the prediction that interest 
rates will come down sharply, although a declining tendency 
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has been observed recently. For the same reason it is 
difficult to make any forecast concerning the strength 
of the dollar on the currency exchange market. While 
a strong dollar would obviously decrease somewhat 
the export drive of the U.S. and would open new 
opportunities for European export industries on the 
U.S. market, it is still too early to say whether the 
tendency for our bilateral trade deficit with the 
U.S. to widen, will come to an end. The likelihood 
is that this deficit will remain at a very high if 
not increasing level. 
2. So far protectionist pressures on both sides of the 
Atlantic have been kept under control. The record of 
U.S. trade policy decisions s:~c2 ~~2 ~~~t:~; iL~o 
effect of the MTN results is encouraging. The fact 
that the frequently announced recessidn has never ceally 
materialized in the U.S. has no doubt contributed to 
this. A failure of the Reagan economic plan tO produce 
the much heralded turn around of the U.S. econom~ 
as far as its major long term weaknesses are concerned, 
could very soon alter the political c:j.."ima te drama tic.:--1lly 
and lead to a more protecttonist climate. The bilateral 
EC/US trade relations could also be influenced by possible 
U.S. trade restrictions with regard to Japan due to 
the triangular nature of some of these trade problems. 
3. The most obvious example of this is to be found in the 
automobile sector. The ITC decision that U.S. car 
imports from Japan are no substantial cause of material 
injury, has not closed the matter. Several bills for 
legislative a.uotas have been introduced in Congress, and there is 
no doubt that-if it came to a vote, trade restrictions would 
find an overwhelming majority in both Houses of Congress. 
- 3 -
Senator Danforth, Chairman of the Senate Finance Subcorrmittee 
on Trade, is nevertheless said to favor a VPJ\.. with the 
Japanese, and as sponsor of one of the bills, he is 
largely determining whether the question of legislative 
quotas will be up for a vote on the floor. In spite of 
a split in the Cabine~. over this issue the likelihood 
is that some restraints will be requested from and 
accepted by the Japanese. Depending on the magnitude 
of such a restraint the Community might be forced into 
a similar attitude, and there is a danger that this might 
lead to Japanese retaliatory measures and thereby to an 
unraveling of the results of the MTN. 
4. A similar danger exists in the field of steel. E.C. 
expo!:"ts to the U.S. which were at 7.4 million tons in 
1978 and 5.4 million tons in 1979, were do~n to 3.5 
million tons in 1980. This downward trend can be 
expected to continue as long as the U.S. economy does 
not improve markedly indeed actual prices in our 
traditional markets in the U.S. are well below the trigger 
prices in effect in this area. The recently decided 
increase of 4.4. percent of the trigger price for the 
second quarter of 1981 can only make the situation worse. 
The price disadvantage faced by E.c. exporters together 
with recent changes in the parity of the dollar have 
increased the risk that some of them might undercut the 
trigger price in order to remain in the market. The 
U.S. steel industry which has a great stake in the 
maintenance of the TPM (it will indeed be able to recover 
about 92% of its outlays for new equipment, if the TPM 
remains in force until 1985) cannot be expected to stand idly 
while the trigger r-,rice wouJ d be eroded. The ini t.ia tion 
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of antidumping and countervailing duty investigations 
could therefore again become a real threat and could be 
the source of serious tensions. 
5. In the field of textiles, 1980 has witnessed a sharp 
increase in Community imports from the U.S. The Community 
had a net textile closing deficit of 300 million uce with 
the U.S. in 1979 which could rise to 500 million uce in 
1978. Carpets, bedlinens and T-shirts/sweatshirts, remain 
problem areas, whereas the import surge for other items 
appears to be leveling off. There is still a real danger 
that particularly affected member countries like 
Great Britain, might have to ask for import relief which in 
turn could lead to retaliatory measures by the U.S. 
Adminis~ration. 
In addition to these bilateral trade aspects, the imports 
surge of U.S. textile products in the Community has wider 
implications on the upcoming renegotiations of the MFA: 
it tends to make it more difficult for the Community to 
argue for continuing limitation of LDC exports into the 
Community. 
6. Other pending sectoral trade problems which might still 
lead to considerable tensions: 
- Petrochemicals and synthetic fibers. Where subsisting 
price regulations for natural gas will continue to give 
U.S. industry an artificial cost advantage through lower 
feedstock prices. 
Kraft. Where U.S. are pressing the E.C. for a speedy 
adoption of a new tariff definition and in the meantime 
complain about the customs treatment of U.S. shipments 
of saturating Kraft by Italian customs authorities. 
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7. In the field of export policy a likely area of tension 
exists in the area of export credits. The u. s. attempt 
to modify the OECD concensus in a way that would bring 
export credit terms closer to market conditions, has 
been thwarted until now by more restrictive proposals 
made by the Community. The budgetary policy of the 
Reagan Administration ~hich includes seizable reductions 
in Eximbank direct lending authority, could lead to a 
hardening of the U.S. attitude. Failing OECD agreement 
it cannot be excluded that the U.S. might resort in 
certain cases to countervailing duty proceedings. 
According to recent press reports an industry labor 
coalition presently contemplates the possibility of 
such complaints under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 
1974. Furthermore it is virtually certain that failing 
such an agreement the U.S. will retaliate by granting long 
term export credits which E.C. countries will find difficult 
to compete with. 
The unresolved problem of the tax exemption for U.S. 
exporting companies under the DISC system is likely to 
create difficulties. 
8. In the field of export controls the U.S. can be expected 
to take a more rigid position in view of its tougher 
stance on East-West relationships. Presumably the U.S. 
will make a forceful attempt to obtain that Europe and 
Japan do likewise. Apart from Cocom, the Economic Summit 
meetings could be used as a framework for such policy 
coordination given.the greater involvement of the E.C. 
countries in East-West trade 1 considerable difficulties 
can be foreseen in this field. 
6 
9. The above mentioned areas of friction are only the ::,ost 
obvious examples for possible US/EC tensions in the field of 
trade policy. Worsening economic conditions and a growing 
E.C. trade deficit with the U.S. could soon lead to other 
difficulties of this kind. In order to prevent these 
difficulties from having a serious impact on overall 
US/EC relationships, anticipatory action should be taken 
in the following fields: 
- an effort should be made to identify possible areas of 
friction by trying to gather all available economic 
information and by listening to the advice of leading 
trade experts. 
- an attempt should be made to pursuade the embassies of 
the '10' to pool commercial information available 
to them through their consulates and other sources. 
In an effort to promote E.C. exports to the U.S. this 
attempt would have to be conducted in a very cautious 
manner in view of t.'1-ie e::-:isting cornpeti tion between 
the industries of the member states. 
--0--
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MPC/fb 
Conreming Trade Policy, an inportant fact is the ve:ry ronsiderable 
trade deficit which the Community. has with the U.S. (approx. $25 
billion in 1980). There are few indications about the developnent 
of the deficit during 1981; however, although it nay be expected 
to decrease sorrewhat (notably di.E to the appreciation of the dollar} , 
it will still remain ve:ry considerable. This does, of rourse, give 
us a ronsiderable advantage whenever we have reasons to rorrplain 
about U.S. policies. Nevertheless, there are limits to the effectiveness 
of the trade deficit argurrent, and political limits to accepting a 
reficit of this magnitude for a prolonged period. 
MaJor problem areas in 1981 will presumably include the following: 
- Steel: EC exports to the U.S. have decreased from 7. 4 million tons 
in 1978 to 3.9 million tons in 1980. A further decrease may be 
expected in 19 81, dlE to the fact that EC producers are being sqi.Eezed 
between the high U.S. trigger price, and the threat of antidurrping 
and/or anti-subsidy rorrplaints. 
- Export Credits: The U.S., for budgetary and philosophical reasons, 
want to nodify the OECD ronsensus to bring export credit ternB closer 
to rrarket oonditions. The EC position is being blocked by France, 
where President Giscard d'Estaing has taken a personal hard line 
against any conression to the U.S. Unless the OEO) talks show signs 
of succeeding towards this :Eall, it is virtually certain that the 
U.S. -will retaliate by granting long-tenn export credits, where 
France is a corrpetitor for a bid. In few cases, however, will France 
and the U.S. be the sole corrpetitors, and other :M2.rnber States may 
be affected. 
- Export Controls: The ~agan Administration may be expected to strengthen 
controls on high technology (and perhaps even "ordinary" production 
technology) e>.?Orts to the USSR, possibll! terrpered by a less restrictive 
attitude towards Eastern Europe and China. The U.S. will presumably, 
once its basic philosophy has been elaborated, make a forceful atterrpt 
in the CXXX)M framework to.obtain that Europe and Japan do likewise. 
Unless Poland is invaded, it seerrs unlikely that all EC :t,,Elt'ber States 
will agree to a considerable strengthening of CDCOM rules. This is 
likely to be a major area of friction. 
- Petrochemicals: European rorrplaints about artificially cheap U.S. feedstock. 
enrouraging a surge of U.S. :i;:etroc:hemical exports to the EC are liable to 
continue until the price of natural gas is reregulated in the U.S. (at the 
latest by 19 85/87, possibly sooner if the Administration succeeds in 
persuading Congress to modify the natural gas Act • Pressures on the EC 
maJ:ket nay, however, be expected to decrease sorrewhat, dlE to the irrpact 
of the reevaluation of the dollar (which, of rourse, may not be a permanent 
phenorrenon} • 
. .. / ... 
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vmat should t.l-ie Corrtnunity do in respect of these problem areas? 
- Steel: There is no reason for the EC to accept a further decrease of 
its steel exports to the U.S., to the benefit of Korea and Brazil. The 
EC should insist on the nuintenance of a reasonable market share, and 
it should be made ·clear to the U.S. that the EC will not accept a 
repetition of the- 1980 antidumping oorrplaints if the trigger price system 
collapses. 
- E..xport Credits: The Cornnission is in the rrost menviable position of 
being squeezed between the French and the U.S. Pressures may diminish 
if interest rates fall. However, a rorrprornise is clearly neressary, 
leading at least to a reasonable increase in export credit interest rates. 
- Export Controls: This is an area where the Cormn.mity should, but does not, 
exercise its trade policy o:mpetenre. The political consequences of the 
. inevitable split between !-E!lber States when the U.S. start to apply pressure 
are very serious. The tirre seerrs ripe for an appropriate Corrmission 
initiativ~ to bring this issue within the Conm..mity frarrework (where it 
belongs on the basis of Art. 113). 
- Petrochemicals: The Corrmission should maintain its pressure on the U.S. 
to ac02lerate the deoontrol of natural gas prices , not that one should 
expect any tangible results, but. for reasons of maintaining the issue 
on the table. 
************************* 
In rncst of the areas rrentioned above, the Comnission, and consequently the 
Ielegation, plays a role of firefighter and rarely, if ever, does it attempt 
to promote EC interests in a dynamic, forward looking fashion. This may be 
an inherent weakness of certain bureaucratic structures, but there is no 
reason why one should not attempt to rerredy that weakness. At a tirre when 
the EC- is rmning a trade deficit of $25 billion with the U.S., our trade 
policy activities are, at the best, focused on protecting the status quo. 
The M2rru::)er States, through their errbassies, oonsulates , and Olarrbers of 
Comrerre, do-little rrore. There is a void between the noble generalities 
of trade policy (where our main activities lie) and the "ni tty gri tty11 of 
trade prorrotion. · This void could usefully be filled at the EC level. 
In order to avoid ronflicts of (perreived) oornpetenre it would seem necessary 
to start with a non-oontroversial initiative, which would not pit Member 
States against each other. One such area could be that of helping EC companies 
to take full advantage of the $18 billion U.S. Gove:rrurent procurerrent market 
recently opened to foreign oornpetition by the MIN Agreerrent. Tenders will 
be published regularly in the U.S., and in order to pemit EC suppliers to 
submit their bids in tirre it would be most useful to devise a system pennitting 
them to obtain detailed infonnation on the tenders very rapidly. It should 
be possible to do so by using the Euronet system, through a data bank set 
up in Brussels, "fed" by a day-by-day input from a Washington teminal with 
up-to-date inforrration. The cost of such a system would be minimal as 
compared with its potential benefits. 
In the longer tenn, thought could be given to using the Eu:ronet system for 
other trade and investrrent infonnation on the U.S. market, providing a direct 
link between the Ielegation and European e>..'-pOrters. 
~~Q~. 
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TO: nr. de KERGORLAY 
' FROM: U. Knueppel 
SUBJECT: 1. Trade Issues of Concern to the U.S. 
in Agriculture and Fisheries. 
2. Promotion of EC Agricultural Exports 
to the U.S. 
Trade issues of concern to the U.S. 
As indicated in my memo of I-1arch 6, the main issues are: 
1. Increasing EC subsidized grain exports in general, and 
to certain regions in particular (China, North Africa). 
2. The U.S. fears that the EC may envisage a deconsolidation 
of the zero duty for grain substitutes and soybeans as 
well as soybcan products, the possible introductfon of a 
vegetable oil tax being considered as a first step in 
this direction. 
3. The U.S. fears that citrus and almond exports to the EC 
may diminish considerably after the next enlargerr.ent. 
4. The implementation of a hormone ban by the EC could bring 
U.S. meat exports to the EC (valued at more than 200 million 
dollars) to a halt. Poultry spinchilling is more of 
political than economic importance as a sufficiently large 
number of U.S. slaughter plants have already adapted to EC 
requirements. 
5. Possible reduction .of fish product exports following the 
envisaged introduction of a reference price system 
particularly for salmon. 
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Promotion of r:c exports to the U.S. 
1. The nrescnt situation as well as cne outlook are rather 
discouraging. EC exports are stagnant at about 1.9 billion 
dollars annually and U.S. exports to the EC increased from 
7.5 billion in 1979 to 9.3 billion in 1980, and is expected 
to reach 9.8 billion in 1981. 
2. Major difficulties 
EC surplus products are in surplus in the U.S. too, or their 
import to the U.S. is restricted because of EC subsidies 
(red meat, sugar). In other areas such as alcoholic beverages, 
competition from inside and outside the U.S. as well as changes 
in consumer tastes, rna~ increased imports from the EC difficult. 
Quotas are imposed on most cheese imports and the threat of 
quotas exists for products such as tobacco and casein. For other 
subsidized products such as biscuits, etc., major expansion of 
imports is liQited by the threat of countervailing duty or 
antidumping actions. 
For more details, please see annex. 
3. Recommendations 
a) t12rket research is important in order to find new products 
for export. Li: such research could be made in corrunon, it would 
certainly be more efficient than individual rleraber State 
efforts. Chances would probably be best in the high price 
ranges (delicatessen) and in the develo2ment of product lines 
(more diversification of existing export items in the present-
ation as well as i~ the price rangeil-
b) Comrnon p_roduct promotio11 by medias for products without a 
national image ~ould be beneficial. For products with a 
national im~ge (e.g. champagne, toie gras, etc.), a EC 
"label" could be_rather damaging . 
c) Cor.1.rnon promotion centers and comrnon trctde fairs in the U.S. 
would probably be an efficient measure to interest more 
wholesalers and retailers as they ,wuld find all EC products in 
one place. Al th.ough this would also increase competition 
between t1ember States, such common presentations should help to 
promote new or neglected products. The general question 
remains whether 1·1ernber States would be ready to join in such 
efforts. 
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It should be kept in mind however, that local promotion 
centers should also be able to give some advice to those who 
wish to export to the EC since some trading firms are in both 
the import and export business. 
,\:~:-mx TO :-iEi'.,;0 OF :jJ.rch 16, 1981 
The following is the situation fer major EC agricultural export 
itCDS to the U.S. 
1. Surplus products in the EC are also in surplus in the U.S. 
except for red meat and sugar. 
EC red meat exports to th& U.S. are at present limited by an 
exchange of letters, to 5,000 T annually because thbse meats 
are subsidized. Without export subsidies, we could not compete 
with Australia and others. 
There are no EC sugar exports to the U.S. at the moment due to 
pending countervailing duty and antidurnping cases, which may 
not be reviewed under the injury aspect in the near future. 
In addition, U.S. sugai imports in times of low prices, are 
restricted by a fee system and U.S. imports are decreasing due 
to the development of corn sweeteners. 
2. EC exports have their greatest success in relatively expensive 
and sophisticated products. 
a) Wines 
Italy, France and Germany are the main exporters to the U.S. 
However, Italy and France are in heavy competition and Italy 
has the upperhand with rather inexpe~~ive table a~d sparkling 
wines. In view of expanding U.S. production, the threat of 
protectionist lesislation in several states (because of 
high imports from the EC and protectionist barriers in the 
EC vis a vis third country wines) and the trend towards 
inexpensive white wibes, EC wine expoits may soon reach their 
highest point. 
German wines are at the moment somewhat discredited by a 
broadly published case of wine fraud. 
b) Whiskey, Vodka, Gin, etc. 
There is a trend away from whiskey to either wine or cocktails 
of white spirits. Such ,·,hi tc spirits are chea2ly produced 
also in Canada and other countries. Although EC exports have 
some advantage from the cli~ination of the wine gallon, the 
envisaged introduction of export restitutions may involve the 
EC in disputes with the U.S., and countervailing duty 
procedures with unclear o~tcome cannot be excluded. 
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c) Beer 
Sales of EC products decre2sed recently because of competition 
from Canada, Mexico, etc. 
d) Tobacco 
There is a surplus on the-·Arnerican market and a permanent 
threat of the introduction 0£ import quotas. In addition, 
surpluses in other third countries make competition rather 
dif f ic1.1l t. 
e) Cheeses 
In two to three years at the latest, EC exports will reach 
their quota limit. Cheeses outside quota (soft ripened cheeses) 
are developing well but as soon as U.S. cheese producers start 
producing similar cheeses, we will have to face countervailing 
duty procedures because of our subsidies. 
f) Canned Ham 
We won a countervailing duty case, but exports should not be 
incr~ased too quickly in order to avoid a new countervailing 
duty complaint. Due to heavy competition from Eastern European 
countries, considerable EC export increases could only be 
achieved through higher export subsidies. 
g) Biscuits 
We won a countervailing duty case, but the market potential for 
high quality biscuits (also subsidized) is limited. 
h) Foie gras, Sausages 
The market is limited because these products are rather expensive. 
i) Casein 
The market is rather stu.ble. 2\1 though the EC is no•:1 the second 
exporter to the '1.S. and has doubled its exports in the last 
two years, New Zcalan~ and Australia remain important competitors. 
In addition, casein is also highly subsidized by the EC. There is 
a perP1zrnent threat of irr.po~;it.ion of ir.1port. c_ruot2s by Con<Jrcssiona.l 
lP-<JislJ.tion or l)y the l\dP1in.i_str2ction under :.3e:ction 22 of the MA 
of 1933. 
.~ 
. 
Subject: EC/US trade promotion 
March 11, 1981 
JVR/aks 
As a contribution to a note on this subject I would like 
to elaborate on some experiences drawn from EC/Canada 
economic cooperation. 
Trade promotional activities, and other efforts towards 
closely related economic cooneration activities, have 
largely been a member states privilege, because of a 
restrictive interpretation of the notion of commercial 
policy (Article 113 Rome Treaty). Consequently, the EC 
Commission has had little occasion to build up both the 
experience and the mechanismn necessary for action in 
this area. 
The importance of the framework agreement on commercial 
and economic cooperation between the EC and Canada of 
1976, lies in the precedent it sets for deviating from 
the old practice. Mixed feelings of member states about 
this change became apparent in a unanimous decision of 
the Council and the M~mber States 0£ 20 September 1976, 
according to which practical measures of economic 
cooperation under the EC/Canada Joint Committee may not 
be initiated unless a common position has been agreed to 
beforehand under the Community's usual procedures. To my 
knowledge, this procedure has only been applied once (in 
the case of a Canadian energy saving technology). 
Several years of intensive efforts to implement the EC/ 
Canada agreement have basically shown tnree things: 
such efforts by the EC Commission only provoke interest 
with European industries as well as authorities and 
industries on the opposite side when member states 
or at least a large majority of them are not yet active 
in that particular area; it takes considerable work and 
particular creative capacities to identify such areas 
and initiate action. 
the Commission's efforts should largely concentrate on 
small and medium sized companies, who do not have the 
proper means to market their product or initiate joint 
ventures on another continent. 
the Commission's clout in the area of economic 
cooperation will automatically be the biggest in areas 
where the Community as such has a leverage. This applies 
in particular to areas where the EC has common rules 
or policies and where consequently negotiations with 
external partners are its exclusive responsibility 
(external trade, fisheries, nuclear supplies, etc.). 
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It is in this framework that it is easy to under3tand what 
'have been the most successful activities under the EC/Canada 
agreement: a substantial number of business missions, 
largely consisting of representatives of medium sized 
companies often accompanied by bankers, have been organized 
in both directions, mostly in areas with a high technology 
content like: telecommun~cations, aeronautics, forestry, 
products (in particular lumber for construction), non-
ferrous metals, etc. The scope of such missions was mostly 
very large, covering possibilities for supplies, investments, 
technological cooperation, joint ventures, joint marketing 
in third countries, etc. They certainly scored some 
success at company level, but their results were hard to 
assess. Also missions were organized with the participation 
of representatives of power utilities and bankers in areas 
like Uranium and coal. At the Commission's initiative 
interest was developed with major European purchasers of 
natural gas in Arctic LNG projects as an alternative source 
of supply. Occasionally it happened that the Commission's 
assistance was required by a particular M.N.E (eg. sales 
promotion for the Airbus-300; also the case of an impasse 
in a major European investment project for fish processing 
in Canada). 
Given the absence of adequate Commission mechanisms for the 
following-up of such promotional activities, the Commission's 
services sometimes ran into some kind of embarassment. 
However, Com~unity-wise organized professional organizations 
and their Brussels lobbies were often helpful. 
Subject: Energy 
March 11, 1981 
JVR/aks 
The EC and US regularly consult on issues related to 
the world oil market, pauticula!lY in view of 
monitoring supplies of crude oil and oil products and 
controlling undesirable price developments on spot markets. 
Both sides have agreed with other nations on certain targets 
for consumption and imports of crude oil and participate in 
the establishment of international emergency systems in case 
of the threat of new supply crises. 
The new Administration's position on this issue is not yet 
clear: it's philosophy is to rely on market forces to 
increase domestic production and decrease consumption: on the 
other hand it has announced a study concerning it's position 
vis-a-vis a possible broadening of IEA oil crisis mechanisms, 
which seems to imply its basic acceptance of such mechanisms. 
In the absence of an all-round EC energy policy covering all 
the aspects of oil and natural gas supplies, the Community 
will only have limited negotiating possibilities on this 
issue. 
March 11, 1981 
,JVR/aks 
Subject: EURATOM/US nuclear coooeration 
.L 
The former administration's nuclear non-proliferation 
policy was inspired by very strict concepts which showed 
up, a.o. in strong anti-fast breeder and anti-Plutonium 
attitudes. This materialized, a.o. in the unilateral 
US claim to modify the EQRJ\TOM/US agreement in the sense, 
of introducing US prior consent rights on the reprocessing 
of US sourced material and on the use of Plutonium. 
A US Uranium embargo was in force against EURATOM for a 
short while in 1978, which, together with more restrictive 
conditions and more time-consuming procedures for US export 
and transfer licenses enhanced ·the E~ropean perception of 
diminished reliability of the US as a nuclear supplier. 
The new- administration seems eager to restore US credi-
bility and consequently US influence on non-proliferation. 
More attention will likely go to efforts to increase 
multilateral (IAEA) and bilateral consensus on non-
proliferation issues. 
The prior consent claim will not disappear but the new 
priorities could lead the US to accept an extension of the 
legal status quo with EURATOM while being more flexible 
and expeditious in licensing procedures. Meanwhile the 
new administration will probably offer a settlement which 
would imply more predictable ways of exercising prior 
consent rights including the use of Plutonium in 
European reactors. It seems unlikely that Congressional 
opposition would kill such a solution. 
EURATOM has never accepted the principle of renegotiating 
its agreement with the US before their final termination 
in 1995. It feels that the widely shared conclusions of the 
1978-1980 INFCE conference justify the economic use and 
the safeguardability of European advanced reactor 
technologies. Even if EURATOM still depends on the US 
for an essential part of its nuclear supplies (in particular 
for highly enriched uranium) there was and still is strong 
opposition in the Council of Ministers to formally re-
negotiate the EURATOM/US agreement. It is not clear yet 
whether less formal and more pragmatic solutions will be 
acceptable to the Council. 
• March 13, 1 981 
~QI!:_ to Mr. de Kergorlay 
Subject: Foreseeable difficulties with the new U.S. administration 
Eventual new initiatives in the "science and technology" sector 
A. Foreseeable difficulties with the new U.S. administration 
In general R and D project expenditures will be cut in the near future. 
This will enhance the U.S. wish to collaborate internationally at the 
benefit of the U.S. science .. and technology community. 
Spending in R and D projects in the field of nuclear energy, on the 
contrary, will not be cut; forbidden activities in the field of fuel 
reprocessing, plutonium recycle and Fast Breeder Reactor {plutonium 
economy), will most -probably be allowed again. This will have a 
favorable effect to the development of nuclear energy in the U.S. A., 
but also throughout Europe. {The Carter policy has had a real 
depressive effect on the German nuclear industry in particular, 
but also to other European nuclear developments.) 
International cooperation of the U.S. wi II mostly be materialized (from 
the U.S. side) in inte1~national forum (1.A.E.A., O.E.C.D., N.E.A., 
1.E.A.) or through bilateral agreements where it is easier for the 
U.S.A. to impose their wishes to their partners. Thus one may fear 
that U.S. -C. E. C. agreements will be more difficult to settle because 
the terms of exchange are generally less favorable to the U.S. (U.S. 
information is disseminated to all the member states and not only to 
one or two of them) than in bilateral agreements. 
Some ways to enhance relations between the U.S. and the C. E. C. are 
given in appendix 1. Such measures are based on the premise that a 
body, somewhere within the Commission services in Brussels, is 
defining and monitoring the science and technology international 
policy. 
B. Eventual new initiatives in the "science and technology" sector 
CH 
Up until now, the science and technology section is working in a passive 
way in answering to demands coming from Brussels headquarters. Due to 
overburden, it has been completely impossible to envisage to take new 
initiatives. 
The science and technology section could - if properly staffed - take a 
more active attitude in several fields. 
a. ·1 n the science field, an active attitude could be to prepare studies 
on the development _of science in promising sectors. Such studies 
could be useful for decision making bodies in Brussels but also for 
the science counselors of the Ten. Such a service which could 
adapt its activities to requests of the Brussels services but also 
to the req_uests of the embassies_of the ten. In establishing this 
service in this way, it could be the starting point for a Community 
science service among the Ten in Washington (see annex 2). 
b. In the field of technology, an active attitude could be to develop 
services for the technology oriented European Community industry. 
The science and technology section could examine if a common service 
•• J • • 
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here too could not be offered by :he Delegation to the embassies 
of the Ten, (as an example, -free· access to comp uteri zed i nforma-
tion on the European and U.S. technology markets). 
S11ch an initiative could probably find its framework in the 
Commission action related to indust1·ial innovation (annex 3). 
+ 
+ + 
The ideas expressed in a and b hereabove - as any new ideas - need to be 
confronted with existing realities and have to be improved before being 
taken as real possibilities. One must n~member here that it is much more 
difficult to build up an active attitude than to remain passive. I do suggest 
to proceed slowly, cautiously and pro~p essively in assessing what could be 
an active role in the science and technclogy sector. 
In any case, if such initiatives were to be envisaged, a clear reorientation 
of the science and technology section is needed in the direction of upgrading 
and properly staffing it. 
+ 
